根据《普通高等学校本科毕业设计（论文）指导》的内容，特对外文文献翻译提出以下要求： 一、翻译的外文文献可以是一篇，也可以是两篇，但总字符要求不少于 1.5 万（或翻译成中 文后至少在 3000 字以上）。 二、翻译的外文文献应主要选自学术期刊、学术会议的文章、有关著作及其他相关材料，应 与毕业论文（设计）主题相关，并作为外文参考文献列入毕业论文（设计）的参考文献。并在每 篇中文译文标题尾部用“脚注”形式注明原文作者及出处，中文译文后应附外文原文（全文，格 式为 word）。不能翻译中国学者的文章，不能翻译准则等有译文的著作。 三、中文译文的基本撰写格式 1.题目:采用小三号、黑体字、居中打印；段前二行，段后二行。 2.正文:采用小四号、宋体字，行间距一般为固定值 20 磅，标准字符间距。页边距为左 3cm， 右 2.5cm，上下各 2.5cm，页面统一采用 A4 纸。 四、外文原文格式 1.题目:采用小三号、Times New Roman、居中打印；段前二行，段后二行。 2.正文:采用小四号、Times New Roman，行间距一般为固定值 20 磅，标准字符间距。页边 距为左 3cm，右 2.5cm，上下各 2.5cm，页面统一采用 A4 纸。 五、封面格式由学校统一制作（注：封面上的“翻译题目”指中文译文的题目），并按“封 面、封面、译文、外文原文、考核表”的顺序统一装订。
本文采取了一家成长较快速的公司作为样本， 比较债务融资和股权融资后的长期 股票业绩。如果管理者过于乐观的预测他们将获得的资产,那么他们更有可能通过债 务融资来增加资本而不是股权融资。 然而他们通过债务融资获得的资本与股权融资后 的长期的业绩相比将会更差。但是，从另一方面来说，管理者利用“机会窗口”发行股 票， 我们认为会比发行债券有更差的业绩。 伴随着管理者过度的乐观假设， 我们发现， 债务融资比股权融资后的股票业绩更差。 管理者过度乐观对于选择债务或股权融资还 有之后的股票业绩有着显着的影响。 关键词：过度乐观、过于自信、债务融资、股权融资、长期的股票表现 一、前言 股价低和经营业绩差的表现导致了一个假说， 即利用高股价和投资者的过度乐观 的时期，销售定价过高的股票。这个“机会之窗”假说认为，管理者存在时间股权的问 题时，他们公司的股票会被高估（Ritter ） 。然而，这一假说，不能用来解释股 票表现不佳的问题（Spies，Affleck-Graves 和Datta, Iskandar-Datta and Raman ） 。绩效差带来的债务融资问题表明必须要有一种替代假说可以解释这些发现。 ??
Michael Gombola. & Dalia Marciukaityte. The Journal of Behavior Finance,2007 Vol. 8, No. 4, P.225–235
Managerial over optimism and the Choice between Debt
And Equity Financing
This paper compares long-run stock performance following debt financing and equity financing for a sample of rapidly growing firms. If managers are subject to overly optimistic predictions for their asset acquisitions, they are more likely to finance asset growth by debt rather than by equity. The managerial over optimism hypothesis predicts worse long-term performance for debt-financed asset acquisitions than equity-financed asset acquisitions. If, on the other hand, managers take advantage of “windows of opportunity” for issuing equity, we expect worse performance following equity issuance than following debt issuance. Consistent with the managerial over optimism hypothesis, we find that debt financing is followed by significantly worse stock performance than equity financing. Managerial over optimism seems to be a significant factor affecting the choice between debt and equity financing and post-financing stock performance. Keywords: Over optimism, Overconfidence, Debt financing, Equity financing, long run stock performance Introduction Evidence of poor stock and operating performance following equity issues has led to the hypothesis that managers take advantage of periods of high stock prices and investor over optimism in order to sell overpriced equity. This “windows of opportunity” hypothesis suggests that manager?s time equity issues when their firm?s shares are overpriced (Ritter ). This hypothesis, however, cannot be used to explain poor stock performance following debt issues documented by Spies and Affleck-Graves  and Datta, Iskandar-Datta and Raman . Underperformance following debt financing indicates a need for an alternative hypothesis that can explain these findings. We suggest that managerial over optimism is a factor that can explain poor long-term stock performance following stock and, especially, bond issuance. Recent studies show that managerial over optimism affects corporate decisions (e.g., Heaton , Gervais,
Heaton and Odean , Malmendier and Tate [2003 and 2005]). As managers are more affected by the per- formance of their ?rm than are well-diversi?ed shareholders, moderate managerial over optimism can help to ensure that managers behave in the best interest of shareholders by counteracting the effect of managerial risk aversion; however, strong managerial over optimism can result in the undertaking of negative net present value projects and destruction of a firm?s value (Gervais, Heaton and Odean ). An excessively favorable estimate of future outcomes for investments is the crux of this managerial overoptimism hypothesis. When managers have optimistic predictions of investment outcomes, they are more inclined to finance with debt rather than equity. Confidence about the size of future outcomes makes managers unwilling to share future profits with new equity investors and make them more willing to issue debt rather than equity. This study tests the managerial overoptimism hypothesis by examining post-financing stock performance for both debt and equity financing. If managerial overoptimism has a more significant effect on the choice between debt and equity financing and postfinancing performance than manager attempts to time the market and take advantage of windows of opportunity for issuing equity, we expect worse stock performance following debt financing than following equity financing. We focus on a sample of firms with rapid growth in assets and a corresponding need to finance those assets. By focusing on firms that require asset financing, security issuance for other purposes can be largely eliminated. Furthermore, since studying long-term performance does not require identifying a particular issuance date, our study is not limited to firms with explicit announcements of security issuance. Rather than limiting the study to firms that announce new issues of debt or equity, we include all forms of financing and measure financing by the change in debt or change in equity. In this manner, implicit security issuance such as stock-for-stock mergers can be incorporated in the sample. Another reason for focusing on high growth firms is our expectation of stronger managerial over optimism among these firms. All else being equal, overoptimistic managers perceive that they have more good projects available than other managers. As managers should take all projects they believe to have positive net present value, overoptimistic managers would undertake more projects resulting in the faster growth of their firms. There are two reasons why it is important to focus on a sample affected by strong managerial over optimism in a study examining whether managerial over optimism affects the choice between debt and equity financing and poor post-financing performance. First,
the windows of opportunity hypothesis and the managerial overoptimism hypothesis are not mutually exclusive. It is possible that while some managers choose between debt and equity financing to take advantage of windows of opportunity, other managers are significantly affected by overoptimism when making security choice decisions. Even the same manager can be affected by both factors at the same time: an overoptimistic manager may attempt to take advantage of share mispricings. Because of market timing to sell overpriced shares, equity financing will be followed by worse post-financing stock performance than debt financing. Because of the managerial overoptimism effect on the choice between debt and equity financing, debt financing will be followed by worse stock performance. As these factors work in opposite directions, the effect of market timing can cancel the effect of managerial overoptimism in a sample of all debt and equity issues. The second reason for focusing on a sample affected by strong managerial overoptimism is related to the market overoptimism. Poor post-financing stock performance indicates that the market is overoptimistic about the firm obtaining external financing. Overoptimistic managers prefer debt financing to equity financing when they perceive their shares to be underpriced, which happens when managers are more overoptimistic about their firm?s future than is the market. As the market is overoptimistic about financing firms, overoptimistic manager preference for debt financing will be observed only for the most overoptimistic managers whose overoptimism exceeds the overoptimism of the market.Consequently, ifwewould examine the whole population of firms obtaining external financing, it is likely that wewould find no evidence of worse stock performance following debt financing than equity financing, even if managerial over optimism significantly affects the choice between debt and equity financing and post-financing stock performance. This expectation is consistent with the Jung, Kim and Stulz  study that compares stock performance after newbond issues and primary stock offerings and, when controlling for the characteristics of issuing firms, find no significant difference in the post-issue performance. We examine a sample of high-growth firms that includes the top 10% of firms in the Compustat database, based on their one-year percentage total asset growth. The resulting sample contains firms with significant financing during the examined year. We study two subsets of the high-growth sample: a sample of firms that primarily use debt to finance asset growth and a sample of firms that primarily use external equity to finance asset growth. If more overly optimistic managers use debt financing, then we would find worse performance for the sample that primarily uses debt financing. Worse performance for the sample of equityfinancing firms could provide support for the windows of opportunity
hypothesis. We find that debt financing is associated with significantly worse post-financing one- to five-year stock performance. For example, in the first post-financing year, our debt-financing sample underperforms our equity-financing sample by 8% to 10%, depending on the methodology used to control for risk. We control for risk using the matched-sample approach advocated by Barber and Lyon  and a four-factor model, including the three Fama and French  factors supplemented by a momentum factor. We also examine the effect of the choice between debt and equity financing on post-financing performance using a continuous variable to measure a firm?s reliance on debt financing and controlling for firm characteristics. Furthermore, we test the robustness of our results using restricted samples. Regardless of the test design, we find that stronger reliance on debt financing is associated with worse post-financing stock performance. Our results support the notion that the choice between debt and equity financing and post-financing stock performance are affected by managerial over optimism. Alternate Hypotheses Several hypotheses have been presented to explain the price reaction to the announcement of security issuance and the performance following that issuance. In the signaling model presented by Myers and Majluf , investors learn about the private information managers have about the value of the firm?s assets from their choice of financing. Managers avoid issuing securities they believe are underpriced and avoid sharing the value added from good investment opportunities with outside investors. Mangers prefer to fund investments internally and issue lower-risk securities when outside capital is needed. This hypothesis provides background for the managerial over optimism hypothesis and the windows of opportunity hypothesis. Managerial Over optimism Hypothesis A corollary to the signaling hypothesis is the suggestion that managers who are overoptimistic about their firm?s ability to generate wealth-creating projects and believe their equity to be undervalued prefer to issue debt rather than equity. Heaton  formalizes the model examining the effect of managerial over optimism on corporate decisions. He suggests that when managers are overoptimistic about the firm?s prospects, they perceive their firm?s risky securities to be undervalued and, to avoid issuing underpriced securities, prefer debt issues to equity issues. Also, since overoptimistic managers overvalue the projects available to them, they undertake some projects that are
negative net present value projects even though their intentions are to act in the best interests of their shareholders. Recent empirical studies support Heaton?s  hypothesis that overoptimistic managers prefer debt financing to equity financing. Malmendier, Tate and Yan  examine a sample of Forbes 500 firms and find that overconfident CEOs are more likely to issue debt than equity. Furthermore, Marciukaityte  finds that firms obtaining substantial debt financing have higher discretionary accruals than firms obtaining substantial external equity financing. She suggests that high discretionary accruals at the time of debt financing are due to managerial over optimism. Poor stock performance following equity and debt issues (e.g., Ritter , Loughran and Ritter  Spies and Affleck-Graves [1995 and 1999], Datta, Iskandar-Datta and Raman ) suggests that the market is overoptimistic about the value of firms obtaining external financing. For overoptimistic managers to believe that their firm is undervalued, they need to be more overoptimistic than the market about the value of their firm. Behavioral studies suggest that at least the most overoptimistic managers are even more overoptimistic about the value of their firms than the market. These studies show that over optimism and overconfidence are not just characteristics of laypeople; managers are also likely to be overconfident. After testing overconfidence among groups of managers from different industries, Russo and Schoemaker  conclude that “every group believed it knew more than it did about its industry or company” and more than 99% were overconfident. Also, Langer  and Weinstein  show that people tend to be more overoptimistic about outcomes when they believe they have control of those outcomes. Of course, managers do have more control of their firms than investors do. Furthermore, desirability of outcomes and commitment to outcomes increase over optimism (Frank , Weinstein ). As managers? compensation and reputation are affected by the performance of their firms, managers are likely to be more strongly committed to their firms than investors. Even higher intelligence does not seem to protect against over optimism; Klaczynski and Fauth  show that over optimism is actually more severe among people with superior intellectual abilities. Furthermore, as some of the factors affecting managerial and market over optimism may be the same, e.g., past performance of the firm or past performance of similar firms, managers are likely to be the most overoptimistic when the market is overoptimistic. Thus, the most overoptimistic managers will perceive their firm to be undervalued by the market even when it is overvalued. Managerial optimism for individual projects can extend to overconfidence in the ability
to add value to any acquired assets, including acquiring an entire firm. Within the context of a merger, the managerial overconfidence is referred to as “Managerial Hubris.” It is an explanation for acquiring firms paying substantial premiums to acquire targets, where the premiums are in excess of managerial ability to add value to the target assets. The methodology of this study incorporates merger activity within its definition of firm growth, since asset growth can be accomplished either through capital expenditure for new assets, purchase of existing assets from another firm, or mergers. Likewise, debt or equity issued to finance a merger or acquisition is incorporated within the methodology of this study. Such debt or equity issuance will not be accompanied by an announcement of a new security offering even though the effect is the same whether securities are issued via a public offering or in conjunction with a merger or acquisition. Windows of Opportunity Hypothesis If managers are reluctant to issue underpriced securities, then equity issuance would occur primarily when mangers perceive these securities to be overpriced. The managerial practice of issuing overpriced equity receives empirical support in the study by Ritter  of stock underperformance after initial public equity offerings (IPOs). Ritter finds that IPO firms underperform matching firms for three years after the first day of public trading. Such underperformance is even stronger for firms going public in years with heavy IPO activity. These findings, Ritter suggests, “indicate that issuers are successfully timing new issues to take advantage of ?windows of opportunity.”? (p. 4) If investors are overoptimistic about the firm value in certain periods, making equity issues in those periods allows a firm to raise the same amount of money with an issue of fewer shares, taking advantage of new shareholders. This hypothesis suggests that investors are overoptimistic about the value of a firm at the time of the offering and are slow to react to the information contained in the announcement of security issue. Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Spiess and Affleck- Graves (1995) show that post-issue underperformance is not restricted to IPOs; firms making seasoned public equity offerings also underperform matched firms in the one- to five-year post-issue periods. The type of equity offering, public or private, also seems not to matter. Private placements of equity are followed by similar-size stock underperformance as public equity issues (Hertzel, Lemmon, Linck and Rees ). Furthermore, post-issue underperformance is not limited to equity issues in the United States. Levis  documents poor post-issue performance in the United Kingdom. Kang, Kim and Stulz  show that private and public equity issues in Japan are followed by similar poor post-issue performance as equity
issues inthe United States. Although empirical evidence of underperformance following equity issuance is consistent with the windows of opportunity hypothesis, underperformance following debt issuance is not consistent with this hypothesis. However, several studies find stock underperformance following public straight and convertible debt offerings (Spiess and Affleck-Graves ), initial debt offerings (Datta, Iskandar-Datta and Raman ), and bank loans (Billett, Flannery and Garfinkel ). These findings bring into question the windows of opportunity hypothesis as the only explanation of the post-financing underperformance. Since the cost of debt financing depends primarily upon market interest rates and not specific firm performance, managers are not likely to have any better forecast of the future direction of interest rates than do outside investors. Even with private information about the default risk of the issuing company, the value benefits are greater from selling overpriced equity than overpriced debt prior to information about the true default risk becoming public. Sample and Methodology Sample We compile the high-growth sample using the following steps. First, we identify the set of firm-years that are included in both CRSP and Compustat databases during the period 1981-1999. We limit this set to firm years with the data necessary to identify the high growth sample, the debt-financing sample, and the equity-financing sample. We exclude regulated utilities (SIC codes 4910-4949), depository institutions (SIC codes 6000-6099), and holding or other investment offices (SIC codes 6700-6799).We consider only fiscal years that are 12 months long. The high-growth sample includes firm-years in the highest decile of asset growth. We calculate the asset growth as a change in total assets (Compustat item A6) during one fiscal year, divided by total assets at the beginning of the fiscal year. This procedure limits the sample to 7,664 firms. Furthermore, to reduce the problem of cross-sectional dependence of observations, we require that firm-years for the same firm are at least five years apart. If we have more than one firm-year in any five-year period, we include only the earliest one. This procedure creates the high-growth sample including 5,583 firms. The percentage growth in total assets is evaluated for an event year, defined as Year 0. We define the event day as the last day of the third month after Year 0. We use the three-month lag after the end of the fiscal year to allow the market to have access to each firm?s accounting information for Year 0. Our post-event period starts three months after
the end of Year 0. After compiling the sample of high-growth firms and determining event days, we subdivide the high growth sample into subsamples that use primarily debt and external equity financing. The debt-financing sample includes firms with debt financing at least 50% higher than external common-equity and internal equity financing during Year 0, and the equity-financing sample includes firms with external common-equity financing at least 50% higher than debt or internal equity financing during Year 0. We calculate debt financing as a change in total debt (total long-term debt (item A9) plus debt in current liabilities (item A34)) during Year 0, equity financing as a change in common equity (item A60) minus a change in retained earnings (item A36) during Year 0, and internal financing as a change in retained earnings plus depreciation and amortization expenses (item A14) during Year 0. The debt-financing sample includes 1,914 high-growth firms, and the equity-financing sample includes 2,537 high-growth firms. The benefit of our methodology is that the net ofall the firm?s financing activities can be considered rather than only one financing event. Debt issues are frequently motivated by refinancing, either to roll over existing debt that is maturing, to change the maturity of the firm?s debt, or to take advantage of lower interest rates. McLaughlin, Safieddine and Vasudevan  find that about a quarter of their sample of debt offerings resulted in either a negative change in leverage or no change in leverage. Similarly, a debt issue followed by a larger equity issue or an equity issue followed by an even larger debt issue will mask the true nature of the firm?s overall financing strategy. In Table 1, we examine the chronological distribution of the high-growth, debt-financing, and equity financing samples. The high-growth sample is well distributed across time with none of the years including more than 10% of the events. We also find that at least 5% of the high-growth firms are from business services, electronic and other electric equipment; industrial machinery and equipment; chemicals and allied products; instruments and related products; or oil and gas extraction industries (not presented in a table).
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